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ASSESSING A GPS-BASED GLOBAL NAVIGATION
SATELLITE SYSTEM WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE
2004 U.S. SPACE-BASED POSITIONING,
NAVIGATION, AND TIMING POLICY
BRADLEY M. ORSCHEL*
I. INTRODUCTION
N DECEMBER of 2004, the Bush Administration issued a re-
vised policy statement on the use and operation of the federal
government's Global Positioning System (GPS).' As GPS is, and
will continue to be, a critical component of the Global Naviga-
tion Satellite System (GNSS); a new policy has the potential to
significantly impact the current functioning and future evolu-
tion of GNSS.
Dual-usage of GPS technology exists as a central tension that
directly impacts the continued evolution of GNSS. GPS was cre-
ated as a military positioning system, and, as such, its operations
remain under the relatively tight control of the U.S. Department
of Defense; however, GPS, as a component of GNSS, needs to
provide global navigation to multiple forms of transport-for
example, at sea, in the air, or on land-without restrictions on
continuity or access.
Prior to December 2004, the U.S. government operated
under a GPS policy issued in 1996.2 The 1996 Policy, with its
* The author, a 2005 graduate of the Georgetown University Law Center,
wishes to thank Professor Paul G. Larsen for his suggestions and comments
during the drafting of this article.
I See OFFICE OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY POLICY, U.S. SPACE-BASED POSITIONING,
NAVIGATION, AND TIMING POLICN: FACT SHEET (2004), http://ww.ostp.gov/html/
FactSh eetSPACE-BASEDPOSITIONINGNAVIGATIONTIMING.pdf [hereinafter
2004 POLICY].
2 See OFFICE OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY POLICY, FACT SHEET: U.S. SPACE-BASED
POSITIONING SYSTEM POLICY (1996), http://www.ostp.gov/NST/html/pdd6.html
[hereinafter 1996 POLICY]. The 2004 Policy "supersedes Presidential Decision Di-
rective/National Science and Technology Council-6, U.S. Global Positioning Sys-
tem, dated March 28, 1996." 2004 POLICY, supra note 1, at 1.
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emphasis on national security, raised several concerns-stand-
ardization of technology, continuity of service, user access, and
interference-with regard to the use of GPS within the frame-
work of GNSS. In the eight years following distribution of the
1996 policy, the U.S. took steps to address some of these con-
cerns. By 2004, with the advent of new geo-political circum-
stances and new GPS technologies, the U.S. issued its revised
GPS policy: the U.S. Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and
Timing Policy.'
The purpose of this paper is to explore the extent to which
the 2004 Policy supports (or inhibits) the evolution of GPS as
the sole or primary component of a global navigation satellite
system (GNSS). To do this, the paper is divided into a number
of sections: first, the paper provides an explanation of GNSS
and its potential components. Second, the paper presents a
brief technical overview of GPS before considering the national
and international regulatory framework under which GPS oper-
ates. Third, the paper provides a short review of the 1996 Policy
and identifies some of the problems this Policy created with re-
spect to GPS as a GNSS component. Fourth, the paper reviews
the 2004 Policy and analyzes some outstanding concerns gener-
ated by the 2004 Policy as they relate to a GPS-based GNSS. Fi-
nally, with the 2004 Policy as a backdrop, this paper considers
the role of GPS within GNSS.
II. THE GLOBAL NAVIGATION SATELLITE
SYSTEM (GNSS)
Navigation by satellite requires a network of Earth-orbiting
satellites that transmit data to users' receivers.4 Using radio
waves, these navigation satellites communicate with each other
and with ground stations in order to generate position informa-
tion.5 The satellites then transmit this position information to
receivers located, for example, on a ship, a car or a plane. The
receivers can use such data to provide users with their
locations.6
3 See 2004 POLICY, supra note 1.
4 B.D.K. HENAKU, THE LAW ON GLOBAL AIR NAVIGATION By SATELLITE 171
(1998).
5 Id.
6 When this technology is then used for navigation purposes, it is termed ra-
dionavigation. The U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS) is one example of an
Earth-orbiting satellite system that can be used for radionavigation.
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A. GNSS BACKGROUND
In 1991, recognizing that the World War II-era ground-based
navigation network for global air navigation had begun to reach
its technical limits, the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) endorsed a new concept for global air navigation,
termed Communications, Navigation and Surveillance/Air Traf-
fic Management (CNS/ATM).7 This new idea was to be based
on the use of satellites, which would gradually replace the older
ground-based navigation network. The key element of this ap-
proach was a concept called the Global Navigation Satellite Sys-
tem-that is, using satellites for radionavigation. As ICAO
envisioned it, using GNSS, pilots could determine the real-time
location of their aircraft while air traffic controllers could rely
on the technology to increase safety and efficiency.9
Since 1973, the United States has operated a satellite naviga-
tion system."' Russia, too, has operated a system similar to
GPS-but launched at a later date-termed the Global Orbiting
Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS). 1 In 1991, in response
to ICAO's conceptual development of GNSS, the governments
of both the United States and Russia individually offered their
satellite networks to the international civil aviation commu-
nity.'2 Over the next few years, these offers were formalized be-
tween ICAO and both countries, via an exchange of letters, and
GPS and GLONASS became the core of an evolving GNSS.1"
The exchange of letters was done to provide "contracting States
7 Francis P. Schubert, An International Convention on GNSS Liability: When Does
Desirable Become Necessay?, XXIV ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 245, 246 (1999); see
alsoJiefang Huang, Development of the Long-Term Legal Framework for the Global Navi-
gation Satellite System, XXII ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 585, 586 (1997).
s See Huang, supra note 7, at 586.
9 Id. GNSS can be used to support ground, sea, and air travel, and can also be
used for environmental, public safety, recreation, and surveying matters. See Fed-
eral Aviation Administration, GPS Basics - User Segment, http://gps.faa.gov/gp-
sbasics/usersegment-text.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2006).
10 See Federal Aviation Administration, Frequently Asked Questions - Miscella-
neous, http://gps.faa.gov/FAQ/miscellaneous.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2005).
The Satellite system was initially designated Navstar Global Positioning System.
Id.
I I Patrick A. Salin, An Update on GNSS Before the Next ICAO Experts Meeting on the
Legal and Technical Aspects of the Future Satellite Air Navigation Systems, XXII ANNALS
OF AIR & SPACE L. 505, 508 (1997). Both GPS and GLONASS were built and
operated by each country's defense department, and were originally designed,
therefore, as military positioning systems. See HENAKU, supra note 4, at 171.
12 HENAKU, supra note 4, at 171.
13 See Huang, supra note 7, at 587.
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of ICAO with assurances of universal accessibility to . . . GPS
and... GLONASS."1 4 Additionally, in 1995, ICAO established a
panel of legal and technical experts (LTEP) to consider the
longer-term legal framework of the GNSS system. 15
B. GNSS AND ITS POTENTIAL COMPONENTS
As noted above, there are two operational GNSS components:
GPS and GLONASS. A third system, the European GALILEO
system, is scheduled to be operational within the next decade. 6
These primary signal systems can be augmented with regional
secondary systems.1 7 Examples of augmentation include the
U.S. Wide Area Augmentation System (WASS), the European
Geostationary Navigation Overlay System (EGNOS), and the
Japanese Multi-functional Transport Satellite-based Augmenta-
tion System (MSAS). 8
1. GLONASS
GLONASS was designed to function as a global satellite sys-
tem with a complement of twenty-four satellites; however, there
are indications that it lacks appropriate funding and a full slate
of satellites.'" Currently, it operates with eleven functioning
satellites. Additionally, while the system was designed to be in-
teroperable with GPS, concerns remain over the system's time
synchronization capabilities.20 In fact, GLONASS may be best
viewed as an augmentation to GPS and not as an equivalent sub-
stitute, notwithstanding recent agreements between the United
States and Russia.21
2. EGNOS and GALILEO
The European Union (EU) and the European Space Agency
(ESA) began to pursue their own satellite navigation system
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Paul B. Larsen, Global Navigation Satellite Systems: Universal Technology under
Divisive Legal Regimes, XXVII ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 387, 389 (2002).
17 HENAKU, supra note 4, at 172-73.
18 Id. at 173.
19 Larsen, supra note 16.
20 Id.
21 Id. On recent cooperation between U.S. and Russia cooperation, see Press
Statement, Richard Boucher, Spokesman, U.S. Dept. of State, United States -
Russian Federation Joint Statement (Dec. 14, 2004), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/
prs/ps/2004/39748.htm.
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based on concerns that GPS and GLONASS, because they re-
mained under the control of their individual governments,
would "not give sufficient guarantees for the-often strategic-
user applications in Europe.
2 2
The European Commission proposed a two-phased approach
to developing their own global satellite network. First, the Com-
mission sought to create the European Geostationary Navigation
Overlay Service (EGNOS). This system was designed to aug-
ment GPS and GLONASS, enhancing the performance of both
of these existing systems.23 EGNOS began initial operations in
July 2005, and operational stability is expected during 2006.24
Second, the EU and the ESA are designing a global-satellite nav-
igation system-GALILEO-that will operate under European
control, be an alternative to GPS and GLONASS, and serve as
Europe's contribution to GNSS 15 Scheduled to be operational
by 2008, GALILEO is ultimately designed to consist of thirty
satellites.2 6
3. Augmentation
A need to increase the accuracy and reliability of GNSS drives
the requirement for augmentation-as, the development of
EGNOS, noted above suggests.2 7 The type of augmentation de-
pends on the user."8 For example, the Federal Aviation Admin-
istration (FAA) has two different types of augmentation-the
Wide Area Augmentation System (WASS) and the Local Area
Augmentation System Service (LAAS)-designed for different
kinds of flight.2 - Additionally, for maritime vessels, the U.S. aug-
ments GPS with the Differential Global Positioning System
(DGPS), which incorporates ground-based technology to en-
hance GPS accuracy and reliability. DGPS can also be used for
22 Comm'n of the European Cmtys., Commission Working Document: To-
wards a Coherent European Approach for Space, 17, SEC(1999)789, final (June
7, 1999) [hereinafter Towards a Coherent European Approach for Space].
23 Id.
24 EGNOS for Professionals, http://esamultimedia.esa.int/docs/egnos/estb/
egnos-pro.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2006).
25 See Towards a Coherent European Approach for Space, supra note 22, at 17.
26 Commission Directorate - General Energy and Transport, GALILEO - Intro-
duction, http://eiropa.eu.int/comm/dgs/energy_transport/galileo/intro/
steps-en.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2005).
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land-based transport. 1 And EGNOS, discussed above, is an-
other augmentation system. Currently, the U.S. government is
investing heavily in GPS augmentation.32
III. THE GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (GPS)
A. GPS TECHNOLOGY
Like GLONASS, and ultimately, GALILEO, GPS is a space-
based radionavigation system. 3 As noted above, GPS was devel-
oped and is currently managed by the U.S. Department of De-
fense. The satellite component of the system consists of at least
twenty-four satellites that operate in one of six (circular) me-
dium earth orbits (MEO's). Each satellite circles the Earth every
twelve hours and emits a continuous navigation signal on two
different L-band frequencies: Li and L2. 4
1. Communication Frequencies
GPS provides two levels of service: a Standard Positioning Ser-
vice (SPS), which uses the coarse acquisition (C/A) on the Li
frequency and a Precise Positioning Service (PPS) which uses
the P(Y) code on both the Li and L2 frequencies. 5 PPS access
is "restricted to U.S. armed forces, U.S. Federal agencies, and
selected allied armed forces and governments. '36 SPS access is
available to all users on a continuous, worldwide basis, free of
31 Id.
32 J. Bates, FAA Plans for Satellite-Based Air Traffic Control. Program Will Cost $11.5
Billion and Will Include Technology Developed by NASA, SPACE NEWS, June 11, 2001, at
26. For further information on various GPS augmentation systems, see FED. AVIA-
TION ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANsp. & ARP CONSULTING, L.L.C., 2003 AVIATION
CAPACITY ENHANCEMENT PLAN: BUILDING CAPACITY TODAY FOR THE SKIES OF To-
MORROW 55-57 (2003), available at http://www.faa.gov/ats/asc/publications/
03_ACE/CH_6.pdf; see also Federal Aviation Administration, Frequently Asked
Questions, http://gps.faa.gov/FAQ/index.htm (last visited Dec. 19, 2005).
33 DEP'T OF DEFENSE & DEP'T OF TRANSP., 2001 FEDERAL RADIONAVIGATION PLAN
2-2 (2001) [hereinafter 2001 PLAN].
34 NAVSTAR Global Positioning System Joint Program Office, GPS Overview,
http://gps.losangeles.af.mil/jpo/gpsoverview.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2005). Li
= 1575.42 MHz, and L2 = 1227.6 MHz. NAVSTAR GPS Operations, U.S. Naval
Observatory NAVASTAR Global Positioning System, http://tycho.usno.navy.mil/
gpsinfo.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2005) [hereinafter NAVSTAR GPS Operations].
35 NAVSTAR GPS Operations, supra note 34. C/A code has a 1.023 MHz chip
rate, a period of 1 millisecond, and is used primarily to acquire the P-code; the P-
code has a 10.23 MHz rate, a period of 7 days, and is the principal navigation
ranging code; the Y-code is used in place of the P-code whenever the anti-spoof-
ing mode of operation is activated. Id.
36 2001 PLAN, supra note 33, at 2-2.
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any direct user charge.37 Because the system serves both military
and civilian users, it is considered a dual-use technology.
Two additional civil frequencies are under development. One
signal will be added to the L2 frequency at 1227.60 (termed "L2
civil") and a second signal will be added at 1176.45 MHz
(termed "L5").3 s L2 civil is due to enter service with satellites
launched in 2006, and L5 is scheduled to enter service at some
point after 2010."9 These signals are designed to improve the
accuracy and reliability of GPS and "will enable the develop-
ment of a broad range of new and improved GPS applica-
tions."4  Additionally, a new military-only signal (M-code)
transmitting on the LI and L2 frequencies is slated for program
completion by 2010.41
2. System Components
GPS consists of three major components: space, control, and
user. The space component consists of satellites. Four genera-
tions of GPS satellites have operated within the network; the
three later versions make up the existing network, with the most
recent satellite launched in September 2005. A fifth generation
of satellites is tentatively scheduled for launch in 2006.42
The control segment consists of six monitor stations and four
ground antenna stations.43 The monitor stations span the
globe: Ascension Island, Diego Garcia, Kwajalein, Hawaii, Cape
Canaveral, and Colorado Springs.44 Theses stations continu-
ously send data to the GPS Master Control Station (MCS), lo-
cated at Schriever Air Force Base in Colorado, for processing.4 5
Every fifteen minutes, after processing information on the satel-
lites' orbits and clock status-accurate time is critical to provid-
ing accurate position information for the user-the MCS
transmits the updated navigation data to the four ground an-
tenna stations: at Ascension Island, Diego Garcia, Kwajalein, and
37 Id.
38 Id.; see also Federal Aviation Administration: Frequently Asked Questions -
GPS Basics, http://gps.faa.gov/FAQ/faq-gps-text.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2005).
39 See Federal Aviation Administration, supra note 38.
40 Id.
41 NAVSTAR GPS Operations, supra note 34.
42 See id.
43 Id.
44 Id.; see also Federal Aviation Administration, supra note 38.
45 Id.
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Cape Canaveral. The antennae then transmit the data to the
satellites.46
The user segment-GPS receivers-collects and processes the
L-band frequencies emitted by the satellites in order to calculate
position, velocity, and time for the user.47
B. GPS REGULATION
1. Nationally
Regulation of GPS occurs at both the national and interna-
tional level. At the national level, the 1996 Policy created the
Interagency Global Positioning System Executive Board (IGEB),
a board chaired jointly by the Secretaries of Defense and Trans-
portation and tasked with managing civilian and military GPS
coordination-that is, dual-usage.4" The IGEB was supported by
an Executive Secretariat, which handled administrative duties,
and a Senior Steering Group, which handled routine decisions
that did not require involvement of the principals.49
The 2004 Policy replaces the IGEB with a permanent National
Space-Based Positioning, Navigation and Timing Executive
Committee.50 This Committee is to be co-chaired by the Deputy
Secretaries of the Department of Defense (DOD) and the De-
partment of Transportation (DOT)." Additionally, the Execu-
tive Committee is to establish a National Space-Based
Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Coordination Office, which
is to serve as the Secretariat for the Executive Committee. 52
Like the IGEB, the Committee will make recommendations to
federal departments and agencies and to the President on mat-
ters of federal radionavigation policy-which includes GPS
policy.53
To coordinate civilian and military radionavigation policy
(dual-use issues), DOD and DOT jointly issue a Federal Radion-
avigation Plan (FRP) .5 The FRP functions "as the planning and
46 See NAVSTAR GPS Operations, supra note 34.
47 See Federal Aviation Administration, supra note 38.
48 1996 POLICY, supra note 2.
49 See National Space - Based PNT Executive Committee, http://www.pnt.gov/
org/igeb.shtml (last visited Nov. 8, 2005).
50 See id.
51 See 2004 POLICY, supra note 1, at 4.
52 Id. at 5.
53 Id.
54 The FRP is required by 10 U.S.C. 2281(c) (2005). A Memorandum of
Agreement between DOD and DOT provides for radionavigation planning as
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policy document for all present and future [flederally provided
common-use radionavigation systems. 155 On the basis of differ-
ent statutory mandates, DOD and DOT, within the FRP, address
different aspects of radionavigation policy. For example, pursu-
ant to Title 49 U.S.C. 301, DOT is tasked with ensuring "efficient
transportation" for which radionavigation is an important tool. 56
DOD "is responsible for developing, testing, evaluating, imple-
menting, operating, and maintaining aids to navigation and
user equipment required solely for national defense. '5 7 Addi-
tionally, 10 U.S.C. 2281(b) states that "[t]he Secretary of De-
fense shall provide for the sustainment and operation of the
GPS Standard Positioning Service [SPS] for peaceful civil, com-
mercial, and scientific uses on a continuous worldwide basis free
of direct user fees. 58
2. Internationally
At the level of international regulation, ICAO, international
treaties, and the International Telecommunications Union all
have the potential to affect GPS.
a. ICAO Regulation
Because GPS is a dual-use technology that serves not only civil-
ian needs but also national security, the U.S. government is
strongly adverse to relinquishing control over any aspect of the
system. In 1998, however, ICAO adopted a Charter on Rights
and Obligations of States Relating to GNSS Services which can
be viewed as an attempt to assert ICAO control over any future
GNSS.
The Charter is based on Article 44 of the Chicago Conven-
tion. Via the Charter, ICAO indicated that the following
guidelines should apply to international GNSS services:
well as for the development and publication of the FRP. According to DOT's
Research, Development and Technology Plan for 1Y 2006, a FRP for 2005 is the next
scheduled report. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND TECI-
NOLOGY PLAN 4-65 (6th ed. 2005).
55 See 2001 PL.AN, supra note 33, at 1-1.
56 49 U.S.C. 301 (2) (2005); see also 2001 PLAN, supna note 33, at 2-1.
57 See 2001 PLAN, supra note 33, at 1-3.
511 See 10 U.S.C. 2281(b) (2005); see also 2001 PLAN, supra note 33, at 1-1 (provid-
ing details on agency roles and responsibilities).
59' Article 44 states that an ICAO objective is "to develop the principles and
techniques of international air navigation and to foster the planning and devel-
opment of international air transport." See Convention on International Civil Avi-
ation, art. 44, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 16 U.N.T.S. 295.
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States recognize that.., the safety of international civil aviation
shall be the paramount principle in the provision and use of
GNSS.
[States] and aircraft . . .shall have access, on a non-discrimina-
tory basis under uniform conditions, to the use of GNNS
services ...
Every State preserves its authority and responsibility to control
operations of aircraft and to enforce safety and other regulations
within its sovereign airspace; GNSS [providers] shall [not re-
strict] States' [control over their sovereign air space].
[GNSS providers] shall ensure the continuity, availability, integ-
rity, accuracy and reliability of such services, including effective
arrangements to minimize the operational impact of the system
malfunctions or failure, and to achieve the expeditious service
recovery. Such States shall ensure that the services are in accor-
dance with ICAO Standards.
States shall co-operate to secure the highest practicable degree of
uniformity... of the GNSS services.
[GNSS] charges . . .shall [comply] with Chicago Convention,
Article 15.
States shall be guided by the principle of co-operation and mu-
tual assistance [in planning and providing GNSS].
Every state shall conduct its GNNS activities with due regard for
the interests of other States.
[States may provide GNSS services jointly with other States].6°
Language in the 1996 and 2004 Policies, 6 1 recent U.S. agree-
ments with other countries on satellite navigation,6 2 and the gov-
ernment's commitment to ICAO to provide universal
accessibility to GPS, 61 all suggest that the U.S. has a strong inter-
est in interoperability. While the Charter does not bind mem-
60 A32-19 Charter on the Rights and Obligations of States Relating to GNSS Services,
64, 65, http://mdc.com/commercial/noise/resolutions.pdf (last visited Nov. 8,
2005).
61 One of the goals of the 1996 Policy is to "[e]ncourage acceptance and inte-
gration of GPS into peaceful ... applications worldwide." 1996 POLICY, supra
note 2. The 2004 Policy also seeks to ensure foreign interoperability and compat-
ibility with GPS. See 2004 POLICY, supra note 1.
62 See Press Release, Richard Boucher, Dep't of State Spokesman, United States
- Russian Federation Joint Statement (Dec. 14, 2004), http://www.state.gov/r/
pa/prs/ps/2004/39784.htm; see also Press Release, Adam Ereli, Dep't of State
Spokesman, Joint Statement of united States of America and Japan on Global
Positioning System Cooperation (Nov. 22, 2004), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/
prs/ps/2004/38773.htm; see also Press Release, U.S. White House, Fact Sheet:
U.S.-EU Summit: Agreement on GPS-Galileo Cooperation (June 26, 2004),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases2004/06/20040626-8.html [hereinaf-
ter U.S.-EU].
63 See Huang, supra note 7.
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ber states,"4 the U.S. nevertheless has reason to adhere to its
spirit because the charter appears to further international stand-
ardization and interoperability.
b. Treaties
At the level of international law, three international treaties,
in various ways, impact GPS. These treaties are the (1) Treaty of
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celes-
tial Bodies (the Outer Space Treaty);15 (2) Convention on Inter-
national Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (the
Liability Convention);6 and (3) Convention on Registration of
Objects Launched into Outer Space (the Registration Conven-
tion) .67
i. Outer Space Treaty
As the United States is a signatory to the Outer Space Treaty,
Article I of the Treaty would appear to affect GPS operations. In
pertinent part, Article I, paragraph I indicates that "the use of
outer space . . .shall be carried out for the benefit and in the
interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of eco-
nomic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all
mankind."6 Article I, paragraph 1 of the Treaty "has its roots in
an earlier agreement, the Declaration of Legal Principles Gov-
erning the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, which was adopted by the [U.N.] General Assem-
bly in... 1963."69 This Declaration reflected the "belief that the
exploration and use of outer space should be carried out for the
betterment of mankind and . . . [that] States [in conducting
their outer space activities] should be guided by the principle of
64 Paul Larsen, Issues Relating to Civilian and Military Dual Uses of GNSS, 17 SPACE
POLICY 111, 114 (2001).
65 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27,
1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
66 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,
Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability
Convention]..
67 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan 14,
1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter Registration Convention].
68 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 65, art. I.
69 N. Jasentuliyana, Article I of the Outer Space Treaty Revisited, 17J. SPACE L. 129,
139 (1989).
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co-operation and mutual assistance . . . . ,7 Article I legally in-
corporates the Declaration's objective of "[requiring] States to
co-operate internationally in their space ventures. 7 1
A literal interpretation of Article I, paragraph 1, therefore,
could suggest that the U.S. Government violates the Treaty if it
limits GPS access to U.S. or allied forces because such a limita-
tion could be characterized as a failure to cooperate with other
states. However, a closer look at State Department comments
prepared for the Senate hearings prior to approval of the Treaty
suggests otherwise.
During the hearings, in response to a question as to whether,
under Article I, the United States would be required to make its
communication satellites (including those for defense commu-
nications) available for the benefit of all countries, the U.S. ne-
gotiator stated that Article I establishes general goals and that
separate international agreements would be required to cover
the use of particular satellites. 72 In other words, the Treaty re-
flects broad objectives and, in order for the U.S. to be in viola-
tion of provisions mandating access to GPS, the U.S. would need
to have entered into additional agreements with other countries
specifically addressing access to its satellites. Because this has
not occurred, it appears unlikely that the U.S. violates the Outer
Space Treaty by placing restrictions on access to' GPS.
This view is further supported by State Department legal opin-
ions submitted in conjunction with Treaty hearings. Specifi-
cally, the State Department indicated that "Article I, paragraph
1 does not undertake to set any terms or conditions on which
international cooperation would take place."73 Senate Commit-
tee language, adopted during the hearings, also reflects a belief
70 Id. The Declaration goes on to state that States "should conduct all their
activities in outer space with due regard for the corresponding interests of other
States." Id. This language is incorporated in Article IX of the Outer Space
Treaty: "In the . . . use of outer space ... States Parties to the Treaty shall be
guided by the principle of co-operation and mutual assistance and shall conduct
all their activities in outer space . . . with due regard to the corresponding inter-
ests of all other States Parties to the Treaty." Outer Space Treaty, supra note 65,
art. IX. Some scholars have suggested that Article IX's "due regard" language
implies that there may be a "legal obligation on the [part of] GNSS providers to
consider the interests of the international civilian users." See Larsen, supra note
64, at 115.
71 Jasentuliyana, supra note 69, at 139.
72 Treaty on Outer Space: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 90th
Cong. 33 (1967).
73 Id. at 53.
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that the Treaty does not limit the way in which the U.S. might
conduct space activities under Article I. Specifically, the Com-
mittee noted that "it is the understanding of the Committee on
Foreign Relations that nothing in Article I, paragraph 1 [of the
Treaty] diminishes or alters the right of the United States to
determine how ... it shares the benefits and use of its outer
space activities.""
In summary, it appears that, under Article I of the Outer
Space Treaty, the U.S. does not have a legal obligation to pro-
vide unrestricted GPS access to other Treaty signatories. How-
ever, in keeping with the cooperative spirit of the Treaty, an
argument can be made that the U.S. has some obligation-and
perhaps by now it is a de facto obligation-to provide relatively
unrestricted GPS access.75
ii. Liability Convention
Generally speaking, GPS is not considered subject to the Lia-
bility Convention; however, ICAO has sought to develop a liabil-
ity regime that would apply to GNSS providers. The Liability
Convention can hold a launching state responsible for personal
injury and property damages-either absolutely or based on
fault-caused by incidents from the space object it launched.76
Generally, however, the Convention is not interpreted to apply
to indirect damages, under which most GNSS-related damages
would fall.77
For a number of years, ICAO has been working on developing
a liability regime that could make GNSS providers liable for neg-
ligently providing GNSS services to civilian aviation.7" In re-
sponse, the U.S. has argued that because GPS service is provided
free of charge, it is inappropriate to hold the U.S. government
liable for negligence. 79 Additionally, the U.S. government feels
that national law, which governs aviation negligence, is capable
74 Id. at 74.
75 Note, however, that there is no standard against which to measure whether a
country would be violating the spirit of the Treaty.
76 See Liability Convention, supra note 66, arts. II-II1.
77 Kevin K. Spralding, The International Liability Ramifications of the U.S. Navstar
Global Positioning System, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-THIRD COLLOQUIUM ON TiiE
LAW OF OUTER SPACE 93, 98 (1990).
78 Larsen, supra note 61, at 115.
79 Id. at 117.
2005] GPS
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
of addressing any negligence issues arising from satellite
navigation."s
iii. Registration Convention
Finally, GPS is subject to the Registration Convention. Article
I of the Convention requires the launching state to register, with
the United Nations, space objects launched into earth orbit, and
Article IV details what registration information must be
provided.8 1
c. The International Telecommunications Union
The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) is a spe-
cialized United Nations organization that coordinates access to
geosynchronous orbital slots and radio frequencies for satellite
communications.8 2 The origins of the organization date back to
the 1840's and to agreements among European States to coordi-
nate electric telegraph communications.8 3  As technology
evolved, the organization's precursor began to coordinate not
only telegraph but also international telephone communica-
tions.8 4 In the middle of the twentieth century, the organization
adopted methods to coordinate international access to the
radiospectrum.8 5
A constitution, which "defines the roles of the various organs
of the ITU,' '8 6 and a Convention, which "sets forth the proce-
dures for the organization's operation, ' 7 govern the ITU. The
ITU is funded via voluntary contributions from both its state and
private-entity membership.88
For purposes of administering the radiospectrum, the "ITU
has categorized radio [frequencies] according to their broader
functions" and "has divided the world into three regions for the
80 ICAO Doc. SSG-CSN/2-WP/6, plO.
81 See Registration Convention, supra note 67, arts. I, V.
82 Lawrence D. Roberts, A Lost Connection: Geostationary Satellite Networks and the
International Telecommunication Union, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1095, 1105 (2000);
see also Jannat C. Thompson, Space for Rent: The International Telecommunications
Union, Space Law, and Orbit/Spectrum Leasing, 62J. AIR L. & CoM. 279, 286 (1996).
83 For a general history of the ITU, see Joseph Wilson, The International Telecom-
munication Union and the Geostationary Satellite Orbit: An Overview, XXIII ANNALS OF
AIR AND SPACE LAW 241 (1998).
84 Id. at 244.
85 Id. at 245.
86 Roberts, supra note 82, at 1111.
87 Id.
88 Wilson, supra note 83, at 246.
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purpose of allocating frequencies. '89 The Radiocommunication
Sector (or Service)-one of the three ITU units that handles the
substantive work of the organization-manages the radiofre-
quency spectrum.90
A satellite operator interested in building a satellite contacts
an ITU member state which then tells the ITU that the state is
going to "assign a particular set of frequencies ... to this [satel-
lite] operator. '' "l When the member state contacts the ITU,
"the application is reviewed against [a] Table of Allocations to
ensure that the frequencies employed by the proposed system
have been allocated for the type of service contemplated. '9 2 Ad-
ditionally, to avoid any interference problems, notice of the ap-
plication is sent to other member states and checked against the
Master International Frequency Register to make sure that the
frequencies "have not already been designated for use in the
same region by another operator."" Assuming that there are no
problems, the ITU adds "the operator's notification to the fre-
quency register.""
As suggested by the allocation process, the ITU does not actu-
ally distribute radiofrequencies. Rather, it serves "as an effi-
ciency-enhancing resource through which sovereign states
attempt to avoid potential [radiofrequency] usage conflicts. 95
In other words, to avoid interference issues, members use the
ITU as a place to coordinate allocation of radio frequencies.
Once a frequency has been allocated to a specific country, that
country assumes responsibility for assigning the frequency and
for ensuring that the frequency does not interfere with domestic
or international systems.96
Given the global reliance on GPS, any interference (or poten-
tial for interference) with the system's portion of the radiospec-
trum could present a significant problem. Thus, regardless of
89 Id. at 259.
90 Roberts, supra note 82, at 1109. The other two units include the Telecom-
munication Standardization Sector, responsible "for questions concerning stand-
ardization of communication technologies, operations, and tariffs" and the
Telecommunication Development Sector, "responsible [among other things] for
coordinating the responsibilities of the ITU as a specialized agency of the United
Nations." Id.




95 Id. at 1111.
96 Wilson, supra note 83, at 259.
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the direction of the 2004 Policy, to ensure the present and fu-
ture effectiveness of GPS, the U.S. must remain engaged in
working with the ITU. This cooperation may further strengthen
the credibility of the ITU as the place for radiospectrum coordi-
nation. Additionally, the U.S. must remain vigilant in policing
domestic and international interference with the frequencies as-
signed to GPS.97
IV. THE 1996 U.S. GLOBAL POSITIONING
SYSTEM POLICY
On March 29, 1996, the White House Office of Science and
Technology Policy issued a "fact sheet" entitled, "U.S. Global
Positioning System Policy.""a As noted on the "fact sheet," the
document detailed "a comprehensive national policy on the fu-
ture management and use of the U.S. Global Positioning System
(GPS) and related U.S. Government augmentations."9 9 The pol-
icy established six goals, identified a number of guidelines for
operation and management of GPS, and summarized agency
roles and responsibilities with respect to GPS.'00
Underlying the entire Policy is the goal of "support[ing] and
enhanc[ing U.S.] economic competitiveness and productivity
while protecting U.S. national security and foreign policy inter-
ests."''1 More specifically, the Policy identified its six goals as
follows:
(1) Strengthen and maintain U.S. national security.
(2) Encourage acceptance and integration of GPS into peaceful
civil, commercial and scientific applications worldwide.
(3) Encourage private sector investment in and use of U.S. GPS
technologies and services.
(4) Promote safety and efficiency in transportation and other
fields.
(5) Promote international cooperation in using GPS for peace-
ful purposes.
(6) Advance U.S. scientific and technical capabilities. 10 2
The Policy then identified a number of guidelines for GPS
operation and management. These guidelines stated that:
97 A discussion of the U.S. response to interference issues is considered in the
last section of this paper.






[The U.S.] will continue to provide GPS Standard Positioning
Service for peaceful civil, commercial and scientific use on a con-
tinuous, worldwide basis, free of direct user fees.
[The U.S. will] discontinue the use of Selective Availability (SA)
within a decade in a manner that allows adequate time and re-
sources for the U.S. military to prepare fully for operations with-
out SA ....
GPS and U.S. Government augmentations will remain responsive
to the National Command Authorities.
The U.S. will cooperate with other governments and interna-
tional organizations to ensure an appropriate balance between
the requirements of international civil, commercial, and scien-
tific users and international security interests.
[The U.S. will push for] GPS and U.S. Government augmenta-
tions [to be the international standard].
[The U.S.] will not conduct activities that preclude or deter com-
mercial (civil) GPS activities, except for national security or pub-
lic safety reasons.
A permanent interagency GPS Executive Board, jointly chaired
by the Departments of Defense and Transportation, will manage
GPS ... and [its] augmentations."" :
With respect to agency roles and responsibilities, the 1996
Policy indicated that the Defense Department would continue
to acquire, operate and maintain GPS and handle all military
and security aspects of the system; that the Transportation De-
partment would take the lead in all civil and/or commercial
matters; and that the State Department would handle GPS mat-
ters as they relate to foreign governments and international
organizations. 104
The 1996 Policy raised a number of concerns. The first had
to do with Selective Availability (SA). 0 5 Under normal GPS op-
erations, civilians have access to the Standard Positioning Ser-
vice (SPS), while U.S. and allied military users have access to the
more accurate Precise Positioning Service (PPS). With SA acti-
vated, SPS only guaranteed accuracy to within 100 meters. 1"
1113 Id. This intra-agency GPS Executive Board became the Interagency GPS
Executive Board (IGEB), as discussed under "GPS Regulation."
114 1996 Poticx, supra note 2.
15 Federal Aviation Administration, Frequently Asked Questions - GPS, http:/
/gps.faa.gov./FAQ/index.htm (last visited Dec. 19, 2005).
106 According to the Federal Aviation Administration, "[w]ith Selective Availa-
bility (SA), SPS provides predictable accuracies of 100m (2drms, 95%) in the
horizontal plane and 156m (05%) in the vertical plane. UTC (USNO) time dis-
semination accuracy is within 340 nanoseconds (95%) referenced to the time
kept at the U.S. Naval Observatory." Id.
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Second, in its agreement of service memorandum with ICAO,
the U.S. promised to make GPS "available for the foreseeable
future on a continuous world-wide basis."10' However, because
the memorandum did not create a legal treaty obligation and
because the 1996 Policy indicated that GPS was to "remain re-
sponsive to the National Command Authorities," a rational basis
existed for user concern about control issues (for example, con-
tinuity of service and/or user access).1 °8 If GPS service were ab-
ruptly discontinued by DOD, the impact on civilian air
navigation could be dramatic. 09 As indicated by the European
Commission, control concerns were fundamental to the Com-
mission's decision to move forward with GALILEO. 1 '
Third, and as a corollary to the control concern, the fact that
both military and civilian frequencies operated on the same GPS
signal bandwidth could have raised concerns that the civilian
frequency could be disturbed by the military frequencies."'
Fourth, by pushing GPS as the international standard, the
U.S. was clearly seeking to dominate the market for satellite nav-
igation technologies. This approach appeared to coincide with
ICAO's desire for standardization, as implied above under "GPS
Regulation: ICAO Regulation," but it could have raised con-
cerns about compatibility with other GNSS systems-for exam-
ple, GLONASS.
To summarize, then, after the 1996 Policy was issued, it cre-
ated concerns related to Selective Availability of the SPS signal;
control of civilian signals, in general; the impact of military fre-
quencies on civilian frequencies; and technological compatibil-
ity (or interoperability).
Following issuance of the 1996 Policy, but prior to issuance of
the 2004 Policy, a number of changes occurred with respect to
GPS that addressed some of the concerns raised in the 1996 Pol-
icy. First, on May 1, 2000, President Clinton ended selective
availability." 2 Second, and as referred to previously under "GPS
107 Larsen, supra note 16, at 396.
108 As was observed following the 1996 Policy, "the fact that the majority of user
States do not have control over the space segments of the [GNSS] system gives
rise to the need for ensuring accessibility." See Huang, supra note 7, at 589.
109 "[Tlheoretically [this could] mean a shutdown of the entire air transport
system using such GNSS services." See Huang, supra note 7, at 589.
110 See Towards a Coherent European Approach for Space, supra note 22, at 17.
111 Larsen, supra note 64, at 116.
112 See Press Release, Statement By the President Regarding the United States'
Decision to Stop Degrading Global Positioning System Accuracy (May 1, 2000),
available at http://www.ostp.gov/html/0053_2.html.
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Technology," the U.S. government decided to add two addi-
tional civil frequencies to GPS service.' 13 The decision to en-
hance civilian frequencies helped to separate civilian and
military users of the system.' 14
Thus, leading up to the 2004 Policy, some problems with the
1996 Policy had been wholly or partially resolved-for example,
selective availability and increased separation of military and ci-
vilian usage of GPS; however, a number of issues with respect to
GPS policy, remained unresolved-including control (con-
tinuity of service and user access), interference and interopera-
bility.
V. THE 2004 U.S. SPACE-BASED POSITIONING,
NAVIGATION AND TIMING POLICY
In order for the 2004 Policy to support the development of a
world-wide, comprehensive GNSS, the Policy needs to ade-
quately address the issues of control and interference. (Inter-
operability is discussed later.) However, before considering
these issues, it is useful to review the new Policy's goals.
As the 2004 Policy notes,
"[T]he fundamental goal of this policy is to ensure that the
United States maintains space-based positioning, navigation,
and timing services, augmentation, back-up, and service denial
capabilities that:
(1) provide uninterrupted availability of positioning, navigation,
and timing services;
(2) meet growing national, homeland, economic security, and
civil requirements, and scientific and commercial demands;
(3) remain the pre-eminent military space-based positioning,
navigation, and timing service;
(4) continue to provide civil services that exceed or are competi-
tive with foreign civil space-based positioning, navigation,
and timing services and augmentation systems;
(5) remain essential components of internationally accepted
positioning, navigation, and timing services; and
(6) promote U.S. technological leadership in applications in-
volving space-based positioning, navigation, and timing
services. 1 5
113 See 2001 PLAN, supra note 33; see also Larsen, supra note 64, at 116.
114 Larsen, supra note 64, at 116.
115 2004 POLICY, supra note 1.
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The above list suggests a slight change in emphasis, compared
to the 1996 Policy, on a number of fronts. First, national secur-
ity matters appear to be one of a number of important issues for
which GPS technology is now to be used. Whereas the 1996 Pol-
icy began by identifying U.S. national security issues as the Pol-
icy's first goal, the 2004 document appears to reflect a broader
use of GPS technology-that is, not only for national security
matters, but also for economic security, scientific and commer-
cial interests. Perhaps these additional uses were implicit in the
1996 Policy, but the broader focus of the 2004 document may
also reflect the significant increase in non-military usage of GPS
technology. Additionally, the administration's decision to em-
phasize various uses of the technology (for example, economic
security, civil, and scientific uses) may be an attempt to lessen
concern about user access issues.' 16
Second, the 2004 Policy appears to acknowledge the fact that
GPS may no longer be the only viable provider of global satellite
navigation coverage for civilian and/or commercial users.
Whereas the 1996 Policy sought to integrate GPS technology
into civil and commercial applications worldwide-suggesting,
by implication, that GPS should be the worldwide provider of
civilian satellite navigation-the 2004 Policy appears to suggest
that GPS technology should simply be competitive with other
foreign civil space-based navigation systems. This very well may
reflect the United States' acknowledgment of an adequately
functioning GLONASS and an inevitably viable GALILEO.
Third, the 2004 Policy's fifth point from the list above-that
GPS technologies should "[r]emain essential components of in-
ternationally accepted positioning, navigation, and timing ser-
vices"-may reflect the biggest shift in focus when compared to
the 1996 Policy. Specifically, the 1996 Policy sought to establish
GPS as the international standard; ' 17 in the 2004 Policy, how-
ever, the document not only recognizes the development of for-
eign systems but also acknowledges that GPS may just be one of
116 This discussion is not meant to suggest that the 2004 Policy de-emphasizes
military uses of GPS; in fact, with new emphasis on homeland security and the
addition of new frequencies, the Policy and the enhanced technologies suggest
an increased role for GPS in matters of national security.
117 Guideline 5 of the 1996 Policy states that the U.S. "will advocate the accept-
ance of GPS and U.S. government augmentations as standards for international
use." 1996 POLICY, supra note 2.
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a number of global navigation satellite systems.'" However,
whether the new Policy really supports the development of GPS-
based GNSS depends on how the Policy addresses or does not
address control (continuity of service and user access) and inter-
ference issues.
A. CONTROL
The 1996 Policy indicated that GPS and its augmentations
would remain "responsive to the National Command Authori-
ties." I '9 This strong language-which, in the 1996 Policy, may
have served as the basis for rational concerns about continuity
and access-is absent from the 2004 Policy.
Additionally, where as the 1996 Policy indicated that civil
users would not be denied GPS access except on the basis of
national security or public safety reasons, the 2004 Policy pro-
vides no such caveat. In fact, the language in the 2004 Policy is
very explicit with respect to both continuity of service and user
access. Specifically, the 2004 Policy states that the United States
will:
Provide on a continuous, worldwide basis civil space-based, posi-
tioning, navigation, and timing services free of direct user fees
for civil, commercial, and scientific uses, and for homeland se-
curity through the Global Positioning System and its augmenta-
tions, and provide open, free access to information necessary to
develop and build equipment to use these services ...."'
But is the absence of National Command Authority language
and more explicit assurances as to continuity and access enough
to enable foreign users of the service to become comfortable
with a GPS-based GNSS?
Even though the 2004 Policy is missing the explicit language
of the 1996 document, language in the 2004 Policy could easily
be interpreted as suggesting that military uses of GPS will always
take priority. For example, the 2004 document indicates that
the U.S. shall "[p]rovide uninterrupted access to U.S. space-
based global, precise positioning, navigation, and timing ser-
118 The 2004 Policy states that the U.S. should "continue to provide civil ser-
vices that exceed or are competitive with foreign civil space-based positioning,
navigation, and timing services and augmentation systems .... See 2004 POLICY,
supra note 1. The Policy continues by stating that GPS capabilities need to "re-
main essential components of internationally accepted positioning, navigation,
and timing services . . . ." Id.
119 1996 POLICY, supra note 2.
120 2004 POLICY, supra note 1.
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vices for U.S. and allied national security systems and capabili-
ties through the [GPS] . . ," . Some could interpret the
uninterrupted military access statement as a way of implying that
the U.S. might interrupt civilian access in order to provide such
military access. Assuming that remains an option under the
2004 Policy, continuity and user access will remain concerns of
foreign GPS users. Certainly the European development of
EGNOS and GALILEO reflects a long-term discomfort with a
GNSS based solely on GPS.
However, while the 2004 Policy leaves open the theoretical
possibility of the Defense Department temporarily (or perma-
nently) eliminating civilian access to GPS, such an occurrence
may be unrealistic given the extent to which GPS has become
integrated into the world's infrastructure.12 2 Internationally,
Europe's construction of EGNOS (as a system to enhance GPS
signals) and U.S. GPS agreements with Japan and India (which
recognize GPS as a primary provider of satellite navigation tech-
nologies) reflect this integration. 123 Domestically, reliance on
GPS extends from the air to the land and to the sea. Perhaps
most significantly, as ICAO's plans for GNSS indicate, GPS is
critical to air traffic controllers and pilots. This global and
multi-level integration of GPS into the world's transportation,
commercial, and security infrastructure, and the resulting paral-
ysis that would result from discontinuing civilian access to GPS,
suggest that a defacto commitment to continue GPS services may
already exist.
121 Id.
122 Eliminating access might also conflict with assurances the U.S. gave to
ICAO when the U.S. agreed to provide civilian access to GPS; this was the ar-
rangement solidified by the exchange of letters discussed under "GNSS Back-
ground." See the earlier discussion on "GNSS Background" and on the 1996
Policy. However, it is unclear how these assurances should be interpreted in light
of the 1996, and, now, 2004 Policies.
123 See, e.g., Joint Statement of the United States of America and Japan on
Global Positioning System Cooperation, available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/
prs/ps/2004/38773.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2005) [hereinafter U.S.-Japan State-
ment]; see also India-United States Conference on Space and Science, Applica-
tions and Commerce - Strengthening and Expanding Cooperation, available at
http://www.aiaa.org/indiaus2004/index.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2005).
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B. INTERFERENCE
As the January 2004 Department of Transportation's report
indicates, GPS is susceptible to various types of interference. 124
Intentional interference may result, for example, from govern-
ment testing of signals, and unintentional interference may re-
sult, for example, from naturally occurring or man-made
obstructions and, potentially, from terrorists.1 25
The 2004 Policy recognizes the interference problem and
states that the U.S. government shall: "Improve the perform-
ance of space-based positioning, navigation, and timing services,
including more robust resistance to interference for, and consis-
tent with, U.S. and allied national security purposes, homeland
security, and civil, commercial, and scientific users
worldwide ....
One way in which the U.S. is working to address GPS interfer-
ence is via augmentation. That is, the U.S. government heavily
augments (and is continuing to develop augmentation options
for) GPS. 127 GPS augmentation systems (existing or planned)
include: (1) the Maritime Differential GPS Service (MDGPS),
which increases the accuracy and integrity of GPS via land-based
reference stations and provides, among other things, coastal
coverage of the U.S.; (2) the Nationwide Differential GPS
(NDGPS), which will expand MDGPS to cover all surface areas
of the U.S.; (3) the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS),
which, as a satellite-based GPS augmentation being developed
by the FAA, is expected to provide the accuracy, availability, in-
tegrity, and continuity needed to support lateral and vertical
navigation for all phases of flight in the U.S., including certain
categories of approaches and landings; (4) the Local Area Aug-
mentation System (LAAS), which will be similar to WAAS (ex-
cept that it will apply to different categories of flight); and (5)
Loran-C, which provides coverage for maritime navigation in
U.S. coastal areas and also supports some air navigation.1 2 8
124 See OVERLOOK SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY, INC., RADIONAVIGATION SYSTEMS: A CA-
PABILITIES INSTRUMENT STRATEGY (2004), available at http://www.navcen.uscg.
gov/notes and information/DOTRadionavigation TaskForceReport 6_Feb_
2004_FINAL.pdf [hereinafter RADIONAVIGATION SYSTEMS].
125 Larsen, supra note 64, at 117.
126 2004 PoLICY, supra note 1.
127 See 2001 PLAN, supra note 33, ch. 2; see also RADIONAVIGATION SYSTEMS, supra
note 124, ch. 2.
128 For additional descriptions and examples of GPS augmentation, see 2001
PLAN, supra note 33, ch. 2, and RADIONAVIGATION SYSTEMS, supra note 124, ch. 2.
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Heavy augmentation, however, raises two issues related to GPS
and GNSS. First, such heavy augmentation may be an indication
to foreign civilian users that GPS continuity and access issues are
not fully resolved. GPS signals are relatively weak-hence the
need for augmentation; aware of this problem foreign users may
be well advised not to rely on GPS as the primary component of
GNSS. Second, all U.S. augmentation systems and users of aug-
mentation systems are dependent on their ability to receive the
GPS SPS signal.1 29 Assuming that augmentation is necessary to
create the accuracy and precision required for global navigation
and that such augmentation is only effective when the augmen-
tation technology has access to GPS, if access to GPS is re-
stricted, no amount of enhanced augmentation will matter.
VI. DOES THE 2004 POLICY SUPPORT THE EVOLUTION
OF GPS AS THE SOLE-OR PRIMARY-PROVIDER
OF A GLOBAL NAVIGATION SATELLITE SYSTEM?
The 2004 Policy does not appear to support the development
of a world-wide GNSS that would be based solely-or even pri-
marily-on GPS. While the elimination of selective availability
and the development of additional civilian frequencies may in-
crease user confidence in GPS as a worldwide provider of global
satellite navigation, control and interference issues still implicit
in the 2004 Policy would appear to prevent GPS from ultimately
serving as the sole provider of GNSS.
Even though the 2004 Policy is much more explicit in indicat-
ing that continuity of service and user access should not be areas
of concern, language remains suggesting that GPS will always be
subject to national security requirements first. Of course, addi-
tional civilian frequencies may ultimately eliminate access con-
cerns, but nothing in the 2004 Policy suggests that the U.S. will
never discontinue service to certain countries in times of war.13
This fact alone should provide countries with a strong incentive
to develop alternatives to GPS-as the Europeans recognize.
129 See 2001 PLAN, supra note 33, at 2-2.
130 Control issues could arguably, be resolved by placing GPS under the con-
trol of an international entity, perhaps associated with ICAO. It seems unlikely,
however, that the U.S. government would ever agree to an arrangement where it
had to relinquish control over GPS. Additionally, although a de facto commit-
ment to provide continued GPS access may provide some reassurance to a for-
eign GPS user, there remains no guarantee as to how the U.S. government would
respond if there were a global and/or catastrophic U.S. military event that placed
unusual demands on GPS.
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And while interference is more a technological problem than a
policy problem, the susceptibility of GPS and its augmentations
to interference rationally supports the need for additional satel-
lite technologies supporting, or incorporated into, the GNSS.
In some respects, the 2004 Policy recognizes its own limita-
tions and, in doing so, situates GPS as one component of the
GNSS. This fact may be the biggest difference between the 1996
Policy and the 2004 Policy. In other words, the 2004 Policy, ac-
knowledging the reality that control and interference issues-as
they relate to GPS-will remain matters of international con-
cern, works to de-emphasize the role of GPS as the sole or pri-
mary component of GNSS.
Specifically, two statements in the 2004 Policy suggest that
GPS should function as one of a number of components within
the GNSS. First, as noted above, the Policy states that GPS tech-
nologies should "remain essential components of internationally
accepted positioning, navigation, and timing services. . .""' Sec-
ond, the Policy states that the U.S. should "[s] eek to ensure that
foreign space-based positioning, navigation, and timing systems
are interoperable with the civil services of the [GPS] and its aug-
mentations in order to benefit civil, commercial, and scientific
users worldwide."' 32 Collectively, this language suggests that the
U.S. now views GPS as one of a number of systems providing
global satellite navigation; additionally, the second statement re-
flects what are probably the greatest hurdles to establishing a
truly world-wide GNSS: compatibility and interoperability.
Within the last few years, the U.S. government has signed
agreements with a number of foreign entities-Russia, Japan,
and the European Union-seeking to address issues of compati-
bility and interoperability between GPS and each country's
global satellite systems or augmentations.
In December 2004, the United States and the Russian Federa-
tion issued ajoint statement on GPS and GLONASS.":3 In par-
ticular, the statement indicated that "both sides intend to work
together to the maximum extent practicable to maintain radio
frequency compatibility in spectrum use between each other's
satellite navigation and timing signals."' 4 The statement then
131 2004 Poiicx, supra note 1.
132 l(t,
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went on to say that "[b] oth sides will work together [via the crea-
tion of a working group] ... to maintain compatibility and pro-
mote interoperability of GPS and GLONASS for civil user
benefits worldwide. 13 5
In November 2004, the United States and Japan met to recon-
firm the principles of their 1998 Joint Statement on Coopera-
tion in the Use of the Global Positioning System. 1 6 At the 2004
meeting, the U.S. reconfirmed the principle, set out in the 1998
agreement, to "provide the GPS [SPS] for peaceful civil, com-
mercial, and scientific use on a continuous, worldwide basis,
free of direct user fees.' 37 And Japan indicated its intent "to
work cooperatively with the United States to ensure that a free
and open [GNSS] benefits all civil users of GPS. ' 13 1 Finally, Ja-
pan briefed U.S. representatives on its upcoming launch of the
"Multi-functional Transport Satellite (MTSAT) Satellite-based
Augmentation System (MSAS)," a system designed to augment
GPS as a component of a GNSS. 13
9
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, in June 2004, the U.S.
and the European Union agreed to establish a common civil sig-
nal among GPS and GALILEO which, when GALILEO becomes
operational, should provide the first truly multi-component in-
teroperable GNSS. 4 °
VII. CONCLUSION
All of these agreements are promising steps towards establish-
ing a multi-component GNSS that is both compatible and inter-
operable; however, neither the Russian nor the European
Union arrangements have yet produced any concrete results,
and may not for some time. Thus, while the 2004 Policy appears
to be situating GPS simply as one component of the GNSS, the
reality may be much different. In fact, until Russia and the Eu-
ropean Union develop appropriately sized and reliable satellite
systems, GPS-as evidenced by the U.S./Japan agreement-will
most likely remain the centerpiece of the global navigation satel-
lite system. Therefore, the centrality of GPS to GNSS suggests
that foreign users of a GPS-based GNSS will need to accept
135 Id.




140 See U.S.-E.U. Summit, supra note 62.
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GPS's continuity, access, and technological restrictions until
such time as alternative systems are available.
Civilian users, globally, should take some comfort in the real-
ity that there may exist a defacto commitment to provide contin-
uous and/or uninterrupted civilian access to the Global
Positioning System. Nonetheless, it should remain the goal of
ICAO and all other countries reliant on global satellite naviga-
tion to create a multi-component, multi-country navigation sat-
ellite system that does not rely, exclusively, on a single satellite
system. The 2004 Policy supports that goal.
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